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Can it be hate if it is fun?
Discursive ensembles of hatred and laughter in extreme right satire 
on Facebook
Kann es Hass sein, wenn es Spaß ist? 
Diskursive Ensembles aus Hass und Gelächter in extrem rechter 
Satire auf Facebook
Christian Schwarzenegger & Anna Wagner
Abstract: This paper explores the role of satirical pages and groups on Facebook as a 
means of a broader discourse strategy of mainstreaming extreme right political positions 
and populist propaganda. In a qualitative content analysis of six satirical pages and groups 
from four Western democracies, we examine both the original posts and the users’ com-
mentary and interactions. Taking a combined look on the disseminated social media con-
tents and user interactions provides a more nuanced understanding of mainstreaming 
practices than examining one side alone. Results show that the original posts and the sub-
sequent user interactions form a discursive ensemble, which in combination of satirical 
content and comment can at once cloak and unveil the political intent and can serve the 
mainstreaming strategy for extreme right positions by furthering radical narratives, sten-
cils, and images. 
Keywords: Political satire, extreme right, populism, mainstreaming, social media
Zusammenfassung: Dieser Artikel untersucht die Rolle von Facebook-Seiten und Gruppen, 
die sich vorgeblich mit Satire beschäftigen, als ein Element der diskursiven Strategie des 
Mainstreaming von rechtsextremen Positionen und populistischer Propaganda in Social 
Media-Umgebungen. In einer qualitativen Inhaltsanalyse von sechs Satireseiten und -grup-
pen aus vier verschiedenen westlichen Ländern untersuchten wir sowohl die Originalposts 
als auch die User-Kommentare und -Interaktionen. Ein geschlossener Blick auf die verbrei-
teten Social-Media Inhalte und User-Interaktionen liefert ein detaillierteres Bild von Main-
streaming-Praktiken als es eine einseitige Betrachtung vermöge. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass 
die Originalposts und die anschließenden User-Diskussionen ein diskursives Ensemble bil-
den, das in Kombination der Mainstreaming-Strategie extremer rechter Positionen dienen 
kann, indem radikale Narrative, Schablonen und Bilder befördert werden. Das diskursive 
Ensemble aus satirischem Inhalt und Kommentaren kann dabei gleichermaßen die politi-
schen Intentionen verbergen oder sichtbar machen.
Schlagwörter: Politische Satire, Extreme Rechte, Populismus, Mainstreaming, Social Media
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1. Introduction
Extreme right parties and their respective politics have become growingly promi-
nent in Western societies, if not around the globe (Pisoiu & Ahmed, 2015). Feast-
ing on a climate of fear elicited by linking the most recent ‘refugee crisis’ to ter-
rorism and a purported proliferation of Islamization of Western societies, extreme 
right political actors profit from the downsides to globalization and moderniza-
tion by using the insecurities of the masses to bolster their radical worldviews 
(Bornschier, 2018) continuously. These “dark clouds over democracy” (Alvares & 
Dahlgren, 2016), are accompanied by an extreme right agenda to pushing public 
debate towards more extreme right positions and “to normalize” (Wodak, 2018) 
them, “that involves previously taboo ideas, frames, and practices becoming the 
new ‘common sense’” (Kallis, 2013, p. 221). This push towards the right, howev-
er, is not just a situational response to the ongoing situation, but also reflects 
communicative efforts and discourse strategies of the populist right. Cammaerts 
(2018)—in line with other authors—has described strategies used to the end of 
moving boundaries of acceptable speech in public discourses towards more radi-
cal stances and to normalize the radical right view as the “mainstreaming of ex-
treme right-wing populism” (p. 7). The effectiveness of such mainstreaming strat-
egy is thus less to be seen on the individual level of people being susceptible for 
right-wing agitation and thus drifting towards the right and adopting political 
attitudes but rather on the level of discourse at large and regarding how matters 
are debated in society.
Social media are essential tools for these communicative efforts and as a means 
for the dissemination of disinformation or radical political views. Due to their 
networked nature, low threshold for participation and direct mode of communi-
cation through which citizens can easily be reached social media can be ideal ves-
sels for the spread of a populist political agenda (Krämer, 2017). Hence, the goal 
of extreme right populists’ employment of social media platforms is to main-
stream their radical positions, i.e., make them more accessible and acceptable. 
Ultimately, mainstreaming can contribute to nationalist, anti-immigration, and 
racist perspectives becoming normalized in the public sphere. To this end, various 
discursive strategies (Cammaerts, 2018), are adapted to the logic of the platforms 
chosen for mainstreaming purposes. Among these strategies and particularly 
prominent on social media is the use of humorous content such as satire and 
memes. Under the guise of joking and laughing hate speech can be obscured, 
radical positions can appear legitimate and can find broader visibility and wide-
spread circulation among social media users (Doerr, 2017; Wagner & 
Schwarzenegger, 2018).  In this way, more extreme positions might find broader 
resonance beyond confined circles of a knowing few. Extreme right satire can 
thus function as a means of infiltrating public debate with images, ideas, and ide-
ologies in an ostensibly non-ideological way. Doing so can help propagate the 
extremist cause while cloaking the political agenda behind the allegedly satirical 
critique. In this paper, we set out to explore the contents of extreme right satirical 
pages and groups on Facebook. We consider the contents together with the posts 
and the user interactions as a ‘discursive ensemble:’ We analyze how these interac-
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tions work together with the original contents posted and how users reproduce, 
negotiate and amplify or contradict the extreme right populist contents and inter-
pretative patterns offered to them. We do not, however, consider the user interac-
tions as caused by the initial posts or an effect of the satirical content. Rather 
they complement and frame the communicative effort, and they can provide read-
ing instructions for other users, relate the content to other sources and propa-
ganda material or provide a template for angry and hostile reactions towards 
those persons or events portrayed in the satire. As the comment sections can be 
curated and reactions can be deleted at any time, the interactions are not a mere 
representation of reactions. The initial contents and the interactions with them in 
combination are to be considered part of the mainstreaming strategy. 
2. Mainstreaming of extreme right positions, populism, and the role of the media
The extreme right is not a homogeneous or monolithic block but an umbrella 
term to cover a myriad of populist, neo-fascist, white supremacist, racist or Iden-
titarian groups. Also, the expressions used for describing these more extreme ad-
vocates of nationalist politics vary, with notions including the radical right, far 
right, ultra-right and extreme right being partly used interchangeably or as a 
gradual difference for positioning them in a left to right spectrum. Regardless of 
the terms applied, a certain skepticism towards them and their populist means is 
a consensus in academic discourse (Beaufort, 2018; Cammaerts, 2018; Downing, 
2001; Waisbord, 2018; Wodak & Krzyżanowski, 2017). This critical academic 
observation is among other things because extreme rights try to exert political 
influence by positioning themselves against multiculturalism and immigrants, em-
phasizing ethnocentrism and perspectives of nationalist and cultural separation, 
and reinforcing an alleged trench between ‘the people’ and ‘the establishment.’ A 
foundational pillar of all extreme right agitation is, according to Fuchs (2016), to 
personalize social problems and “inscribe them biologically and/or culturally into 
individuals and groups. It uses specific naturalised and essentialised characteris-
tics that are assigned to belong to what is conceived of as enemy groups” (p. 
188). With the increased popularity of extreme right parties not only in Western 
societies but various countries around the globe, narratives developed and pro-
mulgated by extreme right groups have indeed turned out to impact the respec-
tive political agendas causing a shift of political positions to the right in the entire 
spectrum of democratic political parties (Han, 2015; Witteveen, 2017). Despite 
differing political systems and conditions, this pattern is observable in various 
countries where extreme right populists have gained strength (Cammaerts, 2018).
Mainstreaming can be understood as the meta-process that describes a slow 
shift of public discourse towards more radical stances: over the course of time 
political positions are legitimized that had been deemed inappropriate or immoral 
in former times and topics such as national identity, ethnicity, cultural homogene-
ity or immigration are moved from the margins to the center of political discours-
es (Kallis, 2013).  Another reading of the term mainstreaming, however, focuses 
more on the actual strategic application of mainstreaming, which is “situated at a 
symbolic/ discursive level” (Cammaerts, 2018, p. 7). In this article and the study 
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at hand, we understand mainstreaming as a discursive strategy that is employed 
by extreme right actors to push the boundaries of the speakable, which can con-
tribute to the said overall shift towards more radical positions. 
As a discursive practice, mainstreaming does not necessarily equal a broader 
range of the extreme right group’s positions and messages but instead refers to the 
proliferation of specific topics (in the sense of agenda setting) and the narratives, 
frames, and angles, under which these are discussed. More specifically, the strategy 
of mainstreaming includes inter alia the propagation of specific (extreme) terms 
and connotations, the use and reinterpretation of whole semantic complexes, a 
simplification of complex political situations by focusing on a few topics, a playing 
with and breaking of taboos while at the same time downplaying the transgres-
sion, the appropriation and recontextualization of political demands for the own 
purposes (Kallis, 2013; Wodak, 2018). It is always aimed at asserting extreme po-
sitions and bringing them from the margins of public discourse to its center.
Mainstreaming in social media environments goes further than the active con-
tributions made by an individual or collective actor. Also, the anticipated reac-
tions and calculated resonance are part of the discursive strategy. Eliciting emo-
tional responses and interactions by supporters can naturally propagate the cause. 
Besides, also provoking critique can serve the goal as the critical reactions bring 
attention and visibility to a theme because to dismiss or correct false claims, ru-
mors or disinformation also means to address these issues (Cammaerts, 2018). 
Furthermore, critique and counter-speech can also contribute to the self-victimiz-
ing narrative of the far right as an oppressed minority (Wodak, 2017) or can be 
used to ridicule the critics (Drüeke & Zobl, 2016). Mainstreaming as a strategy is 
successful regarding its goals when it cumulates in a slow shift towards extreme 
right political views and topics pushing the boundaries of what can be said, and 
gradually reconfiguring the reservoir of public expression (Önnerfors, 2017). 
2.1. Mainstreaming extreme right views through populism
Populism “that articulates ‘the people’ in an exclusionary manner” (Cammaerts, 
2018, p. 7) plays a pivotal role as both a means and a catalyst of mainstreaming 
practices. Although populist strategies are by no means exclusively applied by the 
extreme right (Engesser, Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2016), populism lies at the very 
heart of their political program and their communicative game plan: “The contem-
porary radical right is, in its majority, a populist radical right” (Betz, 2018, p. 86). 
Populist communicative strategies, as extreme right groups and parties incor-
porate them, commonly entail narratives of the people being oppressed by the 
establishment (Engesser et al., 2016; Krämer, 2014, 2017; Wodak, 2017). This 
anti-elitism, coupled with an ostensible people-centrism and the promised restitu-
tion of an allegedly lost power to the people constitute the carrying columns of 
political populism in the argumentation of the extreme right (Ernst, Engesser, 
Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017). To purport their nationalist ideologies, extreme 
right populist actors emphasize a (national) collective identity by creating enemy 
images and constructing cleavages between the national in-group and (a mostly 
foreign) supposed outgroup (Wodak, 2017). In sum, extreme right groups employ 
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populist strategies that include emphasizing the sovereignty of the people, advo-
cating for the people, attacking the elites, ostracizing others, and invoking the 
heartland (Engesser et al., 2016). 
2.2. The role of (social) media for mainstreaming extreme right positions
Despite their constant criticism of legacy media and thus somewhat paradoxical-
ly, media is key to the enforcement of extreme rights’ populist agenda. In an era 
of mediatized politics and deeply mediatized life-worlds, extreme right agitators 
make use of various media technologies for communicating and distributing their 
political goals and radical agenda (Block & Negrine, 2017; Waisbord, 2003). The 
“media-savvy communication strategies” (Cammaerts, 2018, p. 13) they apply 
helped them gain momentum in political discourses and contributed to their elec-
tion success—with many mass media outlets willingly providing a platform for 
their radical stances (Cammaerts, 2018; Ellinas, 2018; Forchtner, Krzyzanowski, 
& Wodak, 2013). 
Since populism as a strategy is not only employed by politicians but is also 
adopted by mass media organizations, the extreme rights’ populism might coincide 
with and be enforced by a media populism (Krämer, 2014) that entails the produc-
tion of in-group versus out-group narratives, narratives supporting a criticism of 
the elites, an emotionalization of political debates, and so forth. This plays into the 
hands of extreme right actors, as “the media can affect political demand by setting 
the agenda on or framing key issues such as immigration and crime, helping legiti-
mize a political space in which the radical right can thrive” (Ellinas, 2018, p. 269). 
We thus argue that, among other conditional factors, it is this media populism that 
helps the extreme right to mainstream their positions with some mass media out-
lets readily adopting populist communication strategies and unwillingly function-
ing as a mouthpiece of the extreme rights’ strategic orientation. 
Another vital instrument for normalizing extreme right political positions 
through populist communication is social media technologies that allow for com-
munication aloof from traditional media (Krämer, 2017). Social media platforms 
not only enable reaching ‘the people’ through a direct form of communication, they 
also entail a potential for entertainment, emotionalization, and personalization, and 
allow for transnational connection and organization of the extreme right’s ideolo-
gies due to their network character (Doerr, 2017; Ernst et al., 2017; Krämer, 2017). 
Indeed, social media technologies have been shown to contribute to the formation 
of transnational network publics among extreme right activists across Europe (Do-
err, 2017), who are sharing the common objective of opposing refugees and immi-
grants and “have formed populist fronts to combat [allegedly] “illegal” immi-
grants” (Waisanen, 2012, p. 233). Social media as communicative spaces allow 
populists to express their ideological stances and disseminate their political mes-
sages (Engesser et al., 2016) including derogatory and discriminatory radical opin-
ions and even overt hate speech (Ben-David & Matamoros-Fernandez, 2016). 
The use of social media allows the extreme right to reach various audiences for 
various purposes implementing their goal of mainstreaming their political posi-
tions in different segments of public debate:
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For once, the extreme right has successfully established an alternative media 
sphere on social and in digital media, in which they can spread their propagandist 
ideology and conspiracy theories, without running through the filters of legacy me-
dia. Extreme right social network pages and groups with different contents (includ-
ing humor) offer an opportunity of participation, discussion, and communitization 
for their political followers, in which the political positions can be legitimized and 
cultivated. As they create “an environment wherein individuals can socialize them-
selves into a right-wing populist worldview” (Krämer, 2017, p. 1303), they can also 
potentially be contributing to a (further) radicalization of users already close to 
their political agenda or potentially sympathizing with their positions (Johnson, 
2018; Lewis & Marwick, 2017). This radicalization might happen both in the sense 
of a participation in violent, radical political movements as it has been applied in 
several studies (e.g., Aly, Macdonald, Jarvis, & Chen, 2016; Caiani, 2017; Caiani & 
Della Porta, 2018; Koehler, 2014; Pisoiu & Ahmed, 2015) or in the broader, more 
traditional sense of the term as a person’s development towards adopting more 
radical political stances (Meleagrou-Hitchens & Kaderbhai, 2017). 
Further, extreme right actors try not only to reach social media users already re-
ceptive to their political positions but also those who are further away from their 
political views. To this end, they increasingly make use of popular communicative 
strategies such as humor and entertainment on social media. As satire also contains 
elements, which mirror populist approaches (Rolfe, 2017), political actors includ-
ing agitators “successfully co-opt the vehicle of satire for their own purposes” (Hig-
gie, 2017, p. 73). Since positioning themselves against an alleged unitary block of 
“the establishment,” political and cultural elites and mainstream media are one of 
their major goals, satire on social media can be considered the perfect strategy for 
entertaining the masses, disguising hate speech, and implementing their political 
agenda of criticizing the establishment. A breach of taboo, very dark humor and 
openly contesting boundaries of free speech can be appealing for “rebellious 
minds” and people who consider themselves critical thinkers without necessarily 
having a political agenda beforehand. Offensive jokes can be very obvious but also 
highly effective means of cloaking racism and hate speech (Topinka, 2017). Topinka 
(2017) thus argues that “rather than unmasking obscured racist online ideologies, 
scholars must also examine how racism flourishes while hiding in plain sight,” i.e., 
racist discourses in participatory media environments.
3. Political satire and the mainstreaming of extreme right populism
Political satire can be an artistic means to voice critique, explore boundaries and 
contest the limits of free speech—while usually positioned against the politically 
powerful (Behrmann, 2002; Brummack, 1971; Simpson, 2003). It thus combines 
elements of critique and political positioning with elements of humor and enter-
tainment, and moreover entails the often instrumentalized populist notion of the 
people against the establishment. In the last couple of years, satire and political 
entertainment media content, in general, have become increasingly popular 
among both citizens and politicians, due to changing media environments, and 
the mediatization of politics (Baym, 2007; Dörner & Vogt, 2017). Political satire 
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in the mass media such as satirical TV shows or magazines have become a promi-
nent subject of news coverage, and satirical media outlets have grown into a 
trusted source of information, especially among younger people (Feldman, 2016). 
However, political satire is not only limited to mass media content, but also 
increasingly prominent on social media platforms where it functions as a catalyst 
for interactive communication, with users themselves engaging in the production 
of satirical content and discussion of politics-related satirical media content (Crit-
tenden, Hopkins, & Simmons, 2011; Jones, 2017; Rahimi, 2015). Even though 
political satire is predominantly associated with pro-democratic criticism and 
thus seen in a somewhat positive light, rare existent studies indicate that extreme 
right groups employ political satire such as cartoons, memes, and caricatures on 
social media as well to assert their political goals (Doerr, 2017; Punathambekar, 
2015). Studies show that extreme right groups strategically use racist humor as a 
rhetorical device and—similar to other forms of satire (Ferrari, 2017)—stimulates 
interaction, discussion, and contributions in the same vein among people in par-
ticipatory media spaces (Hylton, 2017; Topinka, 2017).
As political satire has been shown to impact people’s political participation, in-
terpersonal communication, and political efficacy under specific circumstances 
(Becker, 2014; Chen, Gan, & Sun, 2017; Landreville, Holbert, & LaMarre, 2010); 
as it has an active entertainment component to it and legitimizes forms of ridicule 
and making-fun-of, extreme right populists have an interest in using satire. The use 
of political satire on social media is particularly convenient to extreme rights for 
several reasons: For once, political satire is apt to spark emotions among the users 
(Bessant, 2016), playing into the strategy of emotionalization frequently employed 
by extreme right populists (Salmela & Scheve, 2017). Second, social media consti-
tute a communicative space where political talk among citizens is frequently taking 
place (Wright, Graham, & Jackson, 2016) and political satire has been shown to 
contribute to interpersonal communication through the evocation of emotions 
(Landreville et al., 2010; Lee & Jang, 2016). Third, people who are especially sus-
ceptible to populism tend to have an entertainment-focused media diet and deliber-
ately select media contents entailing the narrative of the people versus the establish-
ment (Hameleers, Bos, & Vreese, 2017). Fourth, social media as platforms with a 
strong focus on visuals allow for the use of  simple, understandable and catchy im-
agery in the form of memes and caricatures to transport political messages and 
reach social media users (Wagner & Schwarzenegger, 2018). Fifth, political satire 
enjoys trust from the audience, disguises political messages to a certain extent 
through humor and laughter, and allows speaking of the unspeakable while con-
cealing discriminatory contents such as hate speech. Whereas openly racist notions 
might be rejected in the public, racist humor has the potential to prompt people to 
adopt certain narratives and expressions, leading them to be “more compelled to 
indulge in the “forbidden fruit” of racism” (Pérez, 2017, p. 957).  The combination 
of potentially offensive social media content and commending interactions with it 
can further legitimate the joke and make it seem acceptable to laugh about it (be-
cause others did so as well) or to consider it an appropriate satirical critique of an 
actual political or social ill. Sixth, for those users who are already sharing the ex-
treme right political positions, racist humor can be used for purposes of bonding 
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and unifying through the exchange of and discussion about “‘politically incorrect’ 
dark, offensive & twisted humor” (Topinka, 2017). Humor allows winking dis-
tancing from any actual offensive content as well as to establish a community of 
insiders who know how to read the political message beyond the joke. In sum, po-
litical satire on social media, by nature, is an entirely appropriate resource for the 
populist purposes of disseminating their extreme right political agenda, reaching 
different audiences and establishing certain views of the world as allegedly normal. 
4. Exploring mainstreaming in satirical pages and groups on social media: 
Analytical perspective and scope of the study
Bringing together the argumentation outlined in the preceding paragraphs, we 
consider extreme right satirical pages and groups on social media communicative 
spaces, in which the discursive practices of mainstreaming radical right positions 
can be observed and analyzed in a specific setting at a certain point in time. In 
our study, we thus set out to examine the communication and user interaction 
taking place in satirical Facebook pages and groups as one potential means 
through which the discursive strategy of mainstreaming is pursued.
Creators and administrators of such pages and groups offer users contents com-
prising extreme right political stances in the guise of satire and provide them with 
specific frames and patterns of interpretation. Users, on the other hand, regardless 
of their political background or experience with extreme right positions, can dis-
cuss and converse about postings and topics in the commentary section, react to-
wards postings by the extreme right actors and other users and thereby follow or 
dismiss the interpretative patterns offered to them. Their reactions and interactions 
complement the communicative practices and provide reading instructions or tem-
plates for possible responses. We are interested, in how far the wording, reasoning, 
and mindset expressed in extreme right satirical Facebook pages and groups reso-
nates in the comment sections, in how far it is related to other political sources or 
propagandist content. We are further interested in whether critique for openly of-
fensive humor is voiced in the comments and whether such critique is then com-
mented on, countered or ridiculed. As the groups and pages are potentially curated 
spaces where administrators can also delete and block content, which they object, 
we cannot regard the comment section an authentic representation of user reac-
tions. However, this is also why we can assume that comments are regarded as 
acceptable utterances by the administrators. Since both creators/ administrators 
and users are involved in the success of mainstreaming radical positions, narra-
tives, and stencils, we aim at intellectually and analytically combining both per-
spectives in the current study, focusing on both the original content posted in the 
pages and groups and the comments posted by the users as a ‘discursive ensemble.’
5. Method
We conducted a qualitative content analysis of posted content and comments on 
these posts on six satirical Facebook pages and groups from Germany, Austria, 
Canada, and the US. A decision to analyze content from various countries was 
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made because right-wing mainstreaming is not nationally confined but happening 
in many different countries in Europe and beyond. The perspective on different 
countries allows identifying commonalities and peculiarities as well as reconstruct-
ing hints towards transnational networking among right-leaning social media activ-
ists and users (Doerr, 2017). Since the pairs Germany/Austria and US/Canada each 
share linguistic and cultural commonalities, they are particularly apt for an analysis 
of mainstreaming practices, which take place at the discursive and symbolic level. 
Even though all selected countries share similarities regarding their respective po-
litical systems and political culture, they do vary in the extent to which extreme 
right political positions have been normalized within public discourses. Whereas 
Austria has a long tradition of modern right-wing populism and a strong estab-
lished extreme right party, the US experienced a more recent push towards radical 
stances with the Tea Party Movement and later the rise and election of Donald 
Trump as US president (Backes, 2018). Germany and Canada, on the contrary, 
have rising but comparatively weak extreme right parties (Ambrose & Mudde, 
2015; Backes, 2018), with none of them being represented in the parliaments at the 
time of the study. As mainstreaming and a shift towards radical political discourse 
can be observed in all countries to a certain extent, we do expect similarities in the 
patterns of mainstreaming. However, we also assume those countries with a more 
established and institutionalized tendency towards extreme right positions in public 
discourse, namely Austria and the US, to have more visible traces of mainstreaming 
strategies (such as more explicit language) than the other two countries. 
5.1. Sample 
Pages and groups were retrieved by inserting combinations of the words (politi-
cal) satire, right wing, nationalism, (anti)liberalism, humor, and several thematic 
keywords such as refugees, crisis, immigrants, or Islam in both German and Eng-
lish into the Facebook search option. A page or group was included if it explicitly 
or implicitly stated political satire as its primary purpose, satirical content was 
frequently posted on the Facebook walls, and extreme right political positions 
could be inferred from the information text. The final sample of pages and groups 
included the Austrian page Verein Freunde der Tagespolitik (translated: Club for 
friends of day-to-day politics), the German group Freie Satire (translated: Free 
satire), the German page Politische Satire (translated: Political satire), the Cana-
dian page Old Stock Canadian and US American pages AltLibertarian and 
Laughing at Stupid Things Liberals Say. Except for the German group Freie Satire 
that had rather few participants who were nevertheless fond of posting, the pages 
and groups had between 3,225 to 80,445 participants or followers at the time of 
analysis. 
5.2. Selection criteria
The posts and comments were selected for analysis in a two-step procedure: In a 
first step, all original posts on the Facebook pages and groups published between 
August and September 2017 as well as the accompanying comments distributed 
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by the Facebook users were retrieved. In a second step, comments and responses 
to these comments posted beneath the pages’ original posts were counted. If less 
than twenty comments were posted below an original post, all comments were 
included in the content analysis. If more than twenty comments were posted be-
low the original post, however, we selected the first five and the five most recent 
for analysis to limit the amount of data. In the process of counting the comments, 
those that merely consisted of emojis or tags of people were omitted and exclud-
ed from the analysis. The only group in the sample, German group Freie Satire 
was not treated differently from the pages. Even though in principle, all partici-
pants in the group were allowed to post something, the majority of the posts 
stemmed from one administrator, and comments were analyzed regardless of the 
person posting.
5.3. Coding procedure
To analyze the original posts on the Facebook pages/ groups and the users’ com-
ments in combination, we again followed a two-step procedure: In the first step, 
only the original posts were analyzed by applying a visual and textual grounded 
theory coding approach with several rounds of inductively searching for patterns 
until a theoretical interpretation could be condensed. In the cycle of open coding, 
the two authors read the collected material and identified relevant broad catego-
ries of the phenomena. Subsequently, we made connections among these catego-
ries and highlighted posts corresponding to the codes employing QDA software. 
This method allowed identifying overarching patterns in the original posts while 
at the same time analyzing particular posts. Finally, we delved deeper into those 
connections to identify central categories for the analysis.
In a second step, we went back into the material to simultaneously look at the 
original posts and the users’ comments, and apply the categories retrieved in the 
first step to the users’ comments. In the course of this, further categories of reac-
tion and interaction such as, e.g., the adoption of the communicative style (seri-
ous vs. satirical) was developed applying the same coding procedure as in the first 
step. We also coded whether the comment was referring to the original post or 
another comment or commenter, as the discussions would also unfold between 
commenters. We coded when users did relate topics to current affairs or political 
events and when other sources or memes were referenced in the comments.
6. Findings
6.1. Strategies for mainstreaming extreme right positions: Analysis of the 
original posts
The analysis of the original posts revealed that both serious and satirical contents 
were posted under the umbrella of satirical Facebook pages and groups. Hence, 
satire was used as a label to the pages and groups to disguise their actual political 
contents in the first place. Moreover, in case satirical contents were posted they 
also functioned as a cover-up of extremist political positions including the dis-
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crimination against minorities. Within the pages’ and groups’ satirical and serious 
posts, we identified the use of populist strategies including the ostracization of 
others, attacks against the elites, and advocacy for the people (Engesser et al., 
2016). Pages and groups turned against the political establishment in satirical 
form. In the case of one post published by the Austrian page (see Figure 1), a 
campaign slogan of the Austrian Green Party (This is green) is mimicked to equal 
Green politics to racism against Austrian natives. This satirical poster seizes the 
narrative of the elites who would neglect their people (us) and only serve the in-
terests of foreigners (them). The meme is combined with a posted message in 
which a pun referring to “Allah” establishes a link between the unnamed them 
and Muslim immigration. Also posts, which derogated minorities and some of 
society’s most marginalized groups (e.g., homosexuals, transgender, migrants; see 
Figure 2), were typical contents across all pages and the group in the material.
Figure 1. Satirical election poster ascribed to the Green Party and shared by the 
Austrian page Verein Freunde der Tagespolitik on September 15, 2017. The poster 
text translates to “Racism against Austrians: This is Green.” The description text 
written by Verein Freunde der Tagespolitik uses a pun with the word “Allah” and 
translates to “That’s the last straw, what is allowed to rampage in our parliament.”
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Figure 2. Satirical meme posted by the US American page AltLibertarian.
Furthermore, a clear narrative of self-victimization was purported in the form 
that extreme right supporters are staged as oppressed minorities and victims of 
the new “liberal” ideas and values, which would ultimately rob them of their (na-
tional) identities (Figure 3). In sum, it becomes evident from the analysis of the 
original posts that creators and administrators of satirical Facebook pages and 
groups use them for promoting extreme right narratives, stencils, and images (see 
Wagner & Schwarzenegger, 2018, for a more detailed description of the analysis). 
As described above, after the initial analysis of contents shared by the pages/
group we then analyzed the combination of post and comments and how these 
were related and played together, supported or questioned another and how this 
may contribute to the discursive strategy of mainstreaming.
Figure 3. Meme and corresponding comments posted on the Canadian page 
OldStockCanadian.
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6.2. Connecting the dots between posts and comments: A discursive ensemble 
As expected, the mechanisms of mainstreaming employed by the extreme right 
groups echoed in the users’ commentary. For instance, one original post on the 
Austrian page (see Figure 1) received 14 comments, which widely addressed the 
post in a serious tone and supported the message of the satirical picture. According 
to the commenters, this would be a prime example of “typical green hatred and 
hustle against the natives” or “the sad truth,” while asking “who votes for those 
psychos?” Several users shared memes in the comments, referring to the end of the 
Green party, which would come in the next elections. In one post a link to a You-
Tube campaign video by the Austrian right-wing populist party FPÖ was shared—
the message in the video neatly responded to the alleged Green party “racism” as 
FPÖ promises to preserve the Austria we would know from our youth and prevent 
us from becoming foreigners in the own country. The combination of posting and 
comments constitutes a discursive ensemble, which elevates the satirical content to 
political commentary, situates it in the political struggle between the populist right 
and the “treacherous” political establishment and suggests the populist politicians 
as a potential solution. It was a common pattern across pages that populist tropes 
would be emphasized and populist alternatives to the alleged status quo propa-
gated. The various concepts of the enemy reproduced by the users are, for instance, 
reflected in a comment posted on US American page AltLibertarian below a car-
toon on the purported Islamization of Western societies: “In the western world no 
one pushes harder than the left for immigration from low IQ populations from the 
third world” (September 29, 2017). The rhetorical othering of perceived out-
groups of the “common people” forms a unified blend, in which “the left,” “liber-
als,” “Muslim invaders” and all those deemed “abnormal” merged into the undif-
ferentiated people’s enemy. Whereas satire could voice differentiated criticism, the 
messages in these groups lack nuance and propagate and reinforce the persistent 
narrative of the oppressed in-group and the vile out-group. Users seem to have 
identified with the constructed group of disadvantaged and oppressed citizens and 
voice the concerns and discontent with their situation in the comments. A user 
complained posting on the US American page AltLibertarian: “Angers the crap out 
of me how I see this happening and everyone shames me for saying otherwise” 
(September 26, 2017). Similar to mechanisms described as “redpilling” (Lewis & 
Marwick, 2017) as part of the extreme right populists’ agenda, some user posts’ 
showed tendencies to think of themselves as awakened while opposing groups 
would be asleep or naïve sheep.
The users as a community of awakened or knowing people would strongly re-
flect across the material. Especially catchy phrases and name-calling in the satiri-
cal posts were willingly taken up by the users and applied on several occasions, 
not only below the specific post. For instance, when male politicians were called 
“princess,” or pages and groups created puns with the names of politicians, users 
would integrate those in their comments to join in the satirical attacks. Name-
calling and derogatory labels for objected groups used in the satirical setting did 
not necessarily originate there, and thus we cannot discern from our data that 
users adopted them from there. Nevertheless, the use of the same vilifications, 
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puns, and metaphors can establish a sense of belonging and community of con-
noisseurs who can decipher the contents accurately. The satire may obscure the 
malicious intent of some of the postings, but it does not operate with a code dif-
ficult to break or jargon only accessible to an inner core, but instead allows iden-
tifying the message and feeling adept, while maintaining some secrecy; as Topinka 
(2017) describes, hateful humor allows hiding in plain sight. 
Across the different pages, we found that the administrators would eventually 
engage with some of the rare counter-voices. For instance, when a satirical post 
about France being Islamized is challenged by an apparently French user on the 
US American page AltLibertarian, the administrator would resort to the joking 
character of the post and cover behind satirical exaggeration, while still empha-
sizing the political vision of the post, as France would only not be so far “yet” 
(Figure 4). But not only between administrators and users but also among users 
we could identify this communicative pattern. In rare instances, when users ex-
pressed concerns that the satire would be too rude or extreme, others would refer 
to the freedom of art and expression and resort to the page’s purpose of fun: „It 
is a satirical site, people. It is just supposed to be fun” (September 15, 2017).
Figure 4. Meme and respective commentary on the page AltLibertarian illustra-
ting rare counter-voices and the subsequent resort to humor.
6.2.1 Satire as activism and attitude
It is not only the extreme right narratives and communicative templates resonat-
ing in the user comments, but the discursive ensemble of posts and comments also 
showed coherence regarding the communicative style and general attitude to-
wards the political topics under discussion. We already discussed that users would 
often regard the posts on pages and in the group as a serious political commen-
tary and respond emotionally, often furious against the satirically portrayed. Be-
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sides these instances, we could also identify a typical pattern of users who would 
also resort to satirical efforts themselves and replicate the satirical style in their 
articulation. In Figure 5, the US American page Laughing at Stupid Things Liber-
als Say transforms a widespread basis of a meme (optimist view, pessimist view 
combined with some other view) into an anti-feminist attack. The users would 
then proceed with the same logic of the joke turning it against other typical ad-
versary groups of the extreme right, i.e., based on ethnicity and the example of 
Black Lives Matter, sexual orientation with the LGBT-community and legacy me-
dia, namely CNN. Other users would reproduce the satirical implications in the 
original post by creating their own memes, cartoons and photoshopped satirical 
images or embedding already existing ones (see Figure 6). This again speaks for a 
sense of belonging and bonding within the user communities. It also suggests that 
twisted humor, ridicule, and denigration of others are integral to their perceptions 
of and perspective on political issues. In line with Ferrari’s (2017) findings, users 
of the pages and groups seem to employ satire as a form of activism to position 
them in line with the original post’s political intent while at the same time par-
ticipating in the propagated culture and aiming to contribute to a proliferation of 
their then more openly articulated political ambitions. In line with populist po-
litical communication strategies, this would often include resisting the oppression 
by the establishment (Figure 3).
Figure 5. Meme and respective commentary posted on the page Laughing at 
Stupid Things Liberals Say illustrating how users follow and further the logic of 
the joke made in the post.
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Figure 6. Meme showing German Chancellor Angela Merkel that is responded to 
by another similar meme depicting Angela Merkel posted in the group Free Satire.
6.2.2 Uncovering the covered: Overt hate speech in users’ commentary
The findings suggest that the narratives and communicative styles offered by the 
pages and groups are not simply reproduced or adopted by the users, but can 
even be amplified and pushed further towards the extreme. The analysis of the 
posts indicates that while their satirical content is often offensive and hostile to-
wards the supposed enemies, overt hate speech directed against these enemies was 
rare and remained hidden under the “highly obvious and highly effective” 
(Topinka, 2017) cloak of humor in the original posts. Users, on the contrary, 
would veil this cloak in their commentaries, and even further these attacks by ar-
ticulating their hatred in the form of direct insults and death wishes. This amplifi-
cation of hate is illustrated by a comment posted below a meme making fun of 
Muslim members of the LGBTQ community on the US American page Laughing 
at Stupid Things Liberals Say: “They are incredibly stupid. I guess they’ll enjoy 
being chucked off a nice high roof” (September 25, 2017). The commentary refers 
to common imaginaries of the heinous killings of LGBT people by ISIS, thus high-
lighting the ultimate consequence of what the condemned lifestyle may bring; as 
a result, paradoxically wishing upon the “stupid” others what the user allegedly 
profoundly rejects. Although the targets of attack—mostly individual political ac-
tors, immigrants, and the aforementioned ‘strangers on the inside’ such as homo-
sexuals—remain largely the same in the original posts and the users’ commentary, 
commenters push the hate speech to new limits by willingly picking up the cues 
and making them more explicit.
In some cases, we even observed a spiral of escalation in the users’ comments 
with users seemingly participating in a competition of hate speech, coming up 
with even more brutal commentary, measuring who would go further in their in-
sults (see Figure 7 where users try to trump each other in insulting Canadian 
Prime Minister Trudeau). In sum, these findings parallel those of Ben-David 
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and Matamoros-Fernandez (2016), which suggested that discrimination on Face-
book pages of extreme right political parties is merely implied and “then taken up 
by their followers who use overt hate speech in the comment space” (p. 1167). It 
is thus again the analytical look on the discursive ensemble of the posts and com-
ments in combination that helps understand the intentions, the dominant reading 
in the group and the implications of satirical content beyond the actual post. 
Figure 7. Meme and commentary are illustrating a spiral of escalation on the 
page OldStockCanadian.
7. Discussion
The study at hand investigated the discursive strategy of mainstreaming (Cam-
maerts, 2018) and how social media environments dedicated to satirical and hu-
morous contents are employed as part of this communicative strategy to propa-
gate tropes of the extreme right, cloaked by their allegedly humorous nature. 
Doing so, we considered the initial postings on satirical Facebook pages and 
groups and the user interactions related to them as parts of a discursive ensemble, 
which would contribute to the mainstreaming strategy. 
As we could elaborate in the theoretical discussion, the elicited reactions and 
critical responses to the original posts can be an anticipated part of the communi-
cative engagement in social media for the extreme right actors. While satire and 
humor can provide useful cover for hatred, the interaction of and with users can 
provide cues on how users are or should be decoding and engaging with different 
levels of satirical criticism or outright propaganda, and can even call for radical 
measures in the guise of satire. We conducted a qualitative content analysis of us-
ers’ comments on six satirical pages and groups from Germany, Austria, Canada, 
and the US to investigate in how far the interpretative patterns offered by the 
pages and groups are adopted, questioned or amplified by their users. The find-
ings showed that comments support the populist narratives and stencils the pages 
and groups employ in their posts. Attacks against the political and media estab-
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lishment, against constructed outgroups such as immigrants, ethnical or sexual 
minorities and political opponents, as well as the narrative of an oppressed peo-
ple resonate in the commentaries and are in some cases furthered in the com-
ments. Through our methodological design, we did not aim to identify the coher-
ence between posts and comments and effects of the posts on the users. Thus, it is 
important to state that we did not simply assume to observe the imitative action 
on the users’ side. Instead, we need to be aware that the pages and groups we in-
vestigated do not exist in a void and reproduce and swirl up existing tropes from 
the extreme right media sphere. Results also show, however, that users by no 
means remain passive recipients of the political narratives, stencils, and attitudes. 
Rather than being merely an audience, users engage in the furthering and trans-
forming of the satirical and non-satirical statements. Users not only repeat these 
contents and contribute to their circulation, but also reinforce and expand them 
by adding their own satirical media contents.
Regarding contents and comments as parts of a discursive ensemble highlights 
the importance to further scrutinize the complex entanglements between social 
media pages and their users. Through the discursive ensemble of content and 
comments the hidden political intent can both be cloaked—as it purportedly can’t 
be hate if it is fun—or unveiled, through the use of overt hate speech or relating 
the contents to serious political commentary, referencing propagandistic media 
outlets or presenting populist politics and parties as alternatives. The use of hate 
speech seems particularly problematic since open hate speech can contribute to a 
culture of hatred on these platforms: Users confirm and reinforce each other’s 
hate commentary in the extreme right satirical pages and groups thus making in-
terventions and counterarguments by users with contrary views unlikely (see Le-
onhard, Rueß, Obermaier & Reinemann in this issue). Our findings also support 
that the topics and overall narratives in both the contents of the groups and the 
users’ commentary were stable and steady regardless of current events. Main-
streaming of extreme right positions works as a permanent, persistent, and re-
petitive beat composed by various voices instead of consisting of a single cre-
scendo. The focus on the discursive ensemble thus made visible that taking a 
combined look on disseminated social media contents and user interactions pro-
vides a more nuanced understanding of mainstreaming practices than examining 
one side alone. Overall, the differences between the countries we expected regard-
ing the degree of normalization of extreme right positions and the explicitness of 
their contents were hardly visible in the analysis. On the contrary, we found strik-
ing similarities in the topics, tropes, styles, and modes of communication used 
within the pages and groups, which might hint at a mutual/ similar orientation 
towards extreme right actors and a shared ‘social media language’ or digital cul-
ture. Although we only found rare signs of actual transnational networking in the 
form of links or cross-references, it seems plausible to assume that the phenome-
non we observed is translocal and as such, deserves further attention concerning 
its network character and synergies. 
Visual satire in the form of memes and fake images appears to be particularly 
useful and a popular strategy of mainstreaming. According to Shifman (2014), 
online political memes function as a means to ignite persuasion, action, and dis-
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cussion on the audience site, making them especially useful for extreme right 
groups in participatory media. Our study also suggests that mainstreaming in so-
cial media entertainment contexts might be particularly dangerous for another 
reason: Users appear to gain benefits from participating in a community and 
jointly making fun of outgroups, which might further strengthen the ties to ex-
treme right positions. This assumption is illustrated by the fact that users, on the 
one hand, engage in competitions of hate speech and goad each other mutually, 
and on the other hand become defensive when critical remarks of other users 
threaten the conversational culture and political stances of the groups and pages.
While our study, in general, succeeds in snapshotting the discursive ensemble 
of mainstreaming processes of extreme right positions on social media, several 
limitations curtail the informative value of our findings. The meta-process of 
mainstreaming describes a slow shift of public discourse towards more radical 
stances. With the analysis of Facebook groups and pages, we merely focused on 
one particular platform and thus just a small snippet of a discursive ensemble in a 
temporary state at one point in time. Discourses are however characterized by 
their temporal dimension and change over time. A single static analysis of con-
tents at a given time lacks this processual dimension and can thus not grasp the 
proclaimed shift. A longterm or diachronic perspective on the discursive ensem-
bles in the pages and groups we have scrutinized would allow comprehending 
better the discursive dynamics taking place within the extreme right groups but 
also their interrelation with other discourse arenas.
Furthermore, a transmedia perspective (Hasebrink & Hepp, 2017) would al-
low to follow discursive ensembles across various platforms and to analyze how 
a variety of different sources, entertainment or information based, unbiased or 
partisan are interrelated. As we have described, satirical and humorous content is 
just one way among others to disseminate populist communication and to nor-
malize extreme-right views in discourse. The transmedia approach could also en-
compass other (social) media outlets of the far right and look for commonalities, 
overlap, and differences in the various channels. The role of other social media 
platforms and the role of social media in general (in comparison to other outlets) 
for the discourse strategy of mainstreaming could not be grasped with our re-
search design. A further relevant addition to our research could be found by fo-
cusing on actual users and by investigating how they relate to the satirical popu-
list content in their follow-up communication in other contexts of their every day, 
regarding their political attitudes or civic engagement. A media repertoire per-
spective (Hasebrink & Domeyer, 2012; Taneja, Webster, Malthouse, & Ksiazek, 
2012) could help assess the significance of the satirical pages and groups on Face-
book in the lives of the citizens and for the mainstreaming of political positions, 
e.g., are such pages and similar contents a central or peripheral component of 
users individual media diets and information repertoire. 
We conclude that the dissemination and legitimization of extreme right posi-
tions in the form of mainstreaming can contribute to a climate of bigotry, hatred, 
and fear within Western societies, which would then lead to the acceptance of 
more radical measures taken against perceived threats. While it may not be a di-
rect means of radicalization for individuals, these kinds of “satirical” discourses 
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may undermine a sense of security and trust in established institutions of the me-
dia, the state, and the democratic process. It may cultivate and nourish the 
grounds on which radical ideas bloom, furthering radicalization under the benign 
guise of laughter and humorous criticism. In the light of these outcomes, further 
studies should focus on the preventive measures that can and should be taken 
against these forms of online propaganda and the normalization of radical politi-
cal ideas. 
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